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Bryan Van Norden’s Taking Back Philosophy1 is a polemic, literally an extended op-ed, 
arguing that American philosophy departments should allocate more resources and especially 
teaching positions to “less commonly taught philosophies,” especially those from outside the 
Anglo-European world. Let me say three things at the beginning: First, I have no objection to 
Van Norden’s goal. Second, I do not have enough familiarity with American philosophy 
departments to make informed objections. Since getting my Ph.D. in political science I have 
taught for precisely one year in the United States, in political science and Directed Studies at 
Yale. I spent a sabbatical year in Princeton’s alternative philosophy department, the University 
Center for Human Values, at the wrong end of Rockefeller Hall. While I studied philosophy 
and with professors of philosophy, in college, graduate school, and after, and I have published 
in philosophy journals, I am not within the discipline of philosophy. I have worked with and 
taught, and even published a little bit, on some of Norden’s “less commonly taught 
philosophies.”2 Nonetheless, I am cut off from full engagement with Chinese philosophy by 
knowing no Chinese, and with Arabic philosophy by knowing no Arabic. 
Though I agree that philosophic texts of all cultures should be included in the philosophy 
curriculum, I certainly do not share Van Norden’s vision that “in an ideal world, philosophy 
departments should make their own decisions about their curricula internally” (31). I think this 
would only be reasonable if the ideal philosophy department were entirely and completely self-
supporting and had no interest in preparing its late adolescent undergraduate students for 
professional study or nonacademic employment. Unlike Van Norden, I think that in these 
curricular matters the opinions of the outsiders who pay the professors’ salaries and hire their 
students should count for something, and my opinion no less than that of the average welder, 
politician, or professor of surgery. I do not know enough about American philosophy 
departments, or any philosophy departments anywhere, to know if they offer or require the 
right amount of any “less commonly taught philosophy.” So neither my agreement nor my 
disagreement on this point is worth more or less than that of any other colleague or taxpayer.  
The Cultures of Academic Philosophy  28 
 
Third, for reasons I will explain later, I am worried about a potential toxic interaction 
between multiculturalism in philosophy teaching (which I favor) and identity politics.3 I think 
that Van Norden is too soft on identity politics, partly because he is deliberately obtuse about 
the danger that identity politics poses to scholarly standards and fair administrative procedures. 
I write this as somebody whose professional success has benefitted as much or perhaps more 
from the preference for “less commonly taught philosophies” and from identity politics than it 
has been harmed by them. 
 
There are two reasons why we might read a book: because we think it might help us achieve 
our purposes, or because it might help us clarify our purposes. We might hope for such 
clarification because the book holds out the promise of showing us new goals or purposes, or 
because it seems to present concepts that might be alternatives to those in which we have 
formulated our purposes to ourselves. To read a text philosophically is to read with a view to 
challenging or clarifying our purposes. Van Norden claims that “philosophy still reads classic 
texts with that is known as ‘a hermeneutic of faith.’” He goes on to explain that “those who use 
a hermeneutic of faith read texts in the hope of discovering truth, goodness, and beauty” (139). 
I would say, rather, that what is distinctive about a philosophic text is that its author aims to 
get his or her reader to interrogate and assess the meaning and worth of concepts such as truth, 
goodness, and beauty. Any text can be read philosophically, as part of a conscious and 
deliberate inquiry into our purposes and their worth, but some texts are philosophic texts, that 
is, texts whose authors themselves intend to make the reader question his or her purposes or 
concepts 
In some ways this book by Van Norden appears an unpromising occasion for thinking about 
how to read and especially how to read philosophically. Van Norden mostly seems to take for 
granted the disciplinary purposes of American academic philosophers, and this book, Van 
Norden tells us, is deliberately pitched at a less scholarly level than Van Norden’s usual 
attempts in his writing and teaching (xxiii). It often seems careless in expression and thought. 
Does “any Christian,” even those who read their Greek Bible in Greek, or Tagalog, know that 
“2 Corinthians” is to be read “Second Corinthians”? (97) And what are to make of Van Norden 
quoting Monty Python’s John Cleese as an authority for the claim that “among dictatorships 
philosophers have always been among the first people to be silenced” (137)? Heidegger and 
his (albeit non-Pharisaical) students flourished under Nazism. There was good philosophy at 
Moscow State under Stalin. Croce was persecuted by Mussolini, but Gentile flourished until 
he was murdered by self-described “anti-fascists,” and after a period of exile Ortega y Gasset 
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returned in 1948 to head an Institute of Philosophy in Franco’s Spain. Arendt’s claims about 
the affinity of philosophers for tyranny seem more plausible,4 and perhaps Van Norden would 
agree, since he teaches not just at Vassar but at Wuhan in the PRC and NUS-Yale in 
authoritarian Singapore, instead of giving his full energies to educating students in democratic 
or “mob-ruled” America (see 4). 
 
To treat Van Norden’s polemic as an occasion for thought, and in particular, for thinking about 
how and what to read, it might be helpful to attend to certain binary oppositions that come up 
without being deconstructed or even handled especially deftly. The most important, and a 
recurrent problematic in comparative philosophy, is the binary wisdom/philosophy: the 
contrast, if there is one, between the sage and the philosopher (see 30). Philosophy, as we all 
know, means “love of wisdom,” and Plato’s Socrates is guided by the wise priestess Diotima 
in the Symposium to the claim that we love only that which we lack. If philosophers love 
wisdom (and not merely, as Nietzsche cracked, their own wisdom), they must be distinct from 
those who do not long for wisdom because they already have it. Garfield in his preface to 
Taking Back Philosophy attacks Nicholas Tambio’s version of the alleged distinction between 
philosophy and wisdom, but Garfield is more interested in scoring debaters’ points than in 
reconstructing (if only to deconstruct) the most defensible form of such a distinction.5 Van 
Norden in the main text seems blithely unaware of it.6 
The brings us to the binary religion/philosophy: Garfield writes in the preface that “we don’t 
have departments of wisdom traditions because we don’t value what we take them to be” (xvii). 
Notwithstanding Garfield’s remarkably intemperate and ill-informed remark, American 
universities do have departments of wisdom traditions—they are called departments of 
religion, faculties of theology, and schools of divinity (Van Norden acknowledges their 
existence on page 5.) Van Norden calls Confucianism and Taoism part of “a robust and diverse 
native spiritual tradition” in China (17). Yet Van Norden nowhere provides reasons for why 
Confucianism and Taoism belong to the Anglo-European category of “philosophy” more than 
they do to the Anglo-European category of “religion.” 
Van Norden’s notion of philosophy involves a stark binary division between natural science 
and philosophy. Natural sciences, Van Norden writes, “are successful precisely because they 
limit their inquiry to particular aspects of reality using particular methods” (135).7 In their 
original editorial (quoted in full at 9–10), Garfield and Van Norden assert that whereas “Non-
European philosophical traditions offer distinctive solutions to problems discussed within 
European and American philosophy, raise or frame problems not addressed in the American 
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and European tradition, or emphasize and discuss more deeply philosophical problems that are 
marginalized in Anglo-European philosophy,” yet “There are no comparable differences in 
how mathematics or physics are practiced in other contemporary cultures.” Sharon Traweek 
claimed the opposite in her study of particle physicists in the United States and Japan, that 
significant differences exist in how experimental particle physics was pursued in 1970s 
American and Japan, and that these differences reflected deep differences between American 
and Japanese societies.8 Van Norden does not mention Traweek or any other sociologist of 
science or philosophy, though he has an index entry for Alex Trebek. 
In Taking Back Philosophy Van Norden does not assert (though he may well believe) that 
contemporary Chinese philosophy is understudied in America. Thus the more relevant question 
for what the book does claim is whether there is something important for contemporary science 
or mathematics that can be learned from the non-Anglo-European scientific and mathematical 
traditions whether contemporary or not. I have argued that Aristotle’s logic offers an analysis 
of assertions superior to that of modern symbolic logic.9 It would not surprise me if there is 
something relevant or challenging to say, contemporary observational astronomy, that an 
American astronomer can learn, or learn most easily, from scholarship on the Chinese or Indian 
observational traditions. 
One also needs to consider the binary philosophic texts vs. nonphilosophic texts. I agree that 
there is no substitute for reading a text philosophically (5), but at least as an application site for 
Austinian speech-act theory, one can read any text philosophically. I would not contend that 
my philosophical reading of Demosthenes’ oration De Corona makes that speech into a 
philosophical text.10 Surely philosophical interpretation of Confucius is as legitimate as 
philosophical interpretation of Shakespeare, but is Confucius a philosopher? And if so, what 
are the criteria by which Confucius or the author of the Analects are philosophers and 
Shakespeare is not? Van Norden argues at length, and rightly, that something that should be 
called philosophy existed in ancient China. Yet he is cagey or equivocal about when philosophy 
appears in China, and whether Confucius and Laozi are philosophers. They are not, according 
to Van Norden, “plainly philosophers” and are apparently not the best place to begin teaching 
Chinese texts if your goal is to bring out to students “what is philosophically important about 
them” (29). Van Norden does not discuss systematically, even to condemn, the thesis that what 
Confucius and Laozi offer is something possibly better than philosophy, namely, wisdom. 
 
I am not a philosophy professor in an American department, or in a position to dispute Van 
Norden’s scholarship on Chinese texts. I therefore want to add a more personal and 
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autobiographical response to Van Norden’s theses on reading and teaching philosophy, from 
someone whose career has been worked out at the edges of Anglo-European academia and 
American academic philosophy with occasional forays into what Van Norden calls “less 
commonly taught philosophies.” My education gave me a different understanding of how to 
read philosophic texts, from any culture, than Van Norden seems to presume. 
I grew up and began my undergraduate career in the Far West of the United States, at the 
University of Washington in Seattle, that North Pacific portion of America from which East 
Asia was west—and in some ways was closer than the U.S. East. Unlike Van Norden, apart 
from two grandfathers who served in the U.S. Army in World War II, I have no deep family 
ties to American history. My mother is the child of immigrants and my father mostly the 
grandchild. Culturally they are both Lithuanian Jews, Litvaks, my father’s family mostly more 
assimilated and less observant of Jewish law than my mother’s. I had a somewhat fragmented 
traditional Jewish education, from age three to age twenty, combined with secular studies in 
Jewish schools and out of them. For me, a particular wisdom tradition, the Torah as interpreted 
by those whom Van Norden (perhaps following his Rabbi, Jesus) calls the Pharisees (123), was 
manifestly relevant. Other wisdom traditions, and the Western philosophical tradition, were 
not so plainly relevant or worth exploring. 
In Seattle I grew up to some extent with Asian-American children of varying origins and 
degrees of acculturation, though in those years, the 1970s and early to mid-1980s, my Chinese-
American acquaintances were immigrants or the children of immigrants from Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, or the children of “overseas Chinese” from the Chinese diaspora in Malaysia or the 
Philippines: very few or none had any direct experience of Communist China. When in 1986 I 
came to Harvard as a sophomore transfer student at 16, I was quite astonished to discover the 
blatant racism against Asian Americans expressed by some of the administrators. On the other 
hand, at Harvard those were the days of what Harvard’s Ezra Vogel saw as “Japan as Number 
One”: we, students and faculty alike, were impressed, fascinated, and even obsessed with the 
rising wealth and power of Japan, and as a senior I was one of almost 500 students to take a 
course on sixteenth-century Japanese history with the new white Australian professor Harold 
Bolitho. My teaching assistant in Samuel Huntington’s comparative democracies course was 
an exiled Chinese dissident and labor leader. Nonetheless, prior to the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre, which happened a few days before my graduation, I, like my fellow undergraduates, 
gave little thought to China.  
At Harvard I mainly studied mathematics, partly in the Philosophy Department, and political 
philosophy. My teachers of political philosophy were Harvey Mansfield, who encouraged the 
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study of Arabic philosophy, and Muhsin Mahdi, the preeminent modern scholar thereof.11 In 
the Philosophy Department in Emerson Hall I took a course on “the philosophy of life” with 
Robert Nozick (who made occasional references to Indian philosophy) and one on the 
metaphysics of possible worlds. I studied mathematics in Emerson Hall too, with the 
philosophy professors Hilary Putnam (my B.A. thesis advisor) and Warren Goldfarb (who 
examined me on my B.A. thesis). Goldfarb, who knew that I planned to leave mathematics for 
the study of political philosophy, offered me admission into the philosophy Ph.D. program, 
which I refused.  
My refusal was partly out of ignorance: even though I was personally close to a Stanley 
Cavell student, and had heard Cavell speak as respondent to Allan Bloom’s “Fellow elitists” 
lecture,12 I had no idea who Cavell was or what kind of things he did. But I did know that the 
approach to philosophic texts that I had learned from Mansfield and Mahdi was not pursued in 
the philosophy department at Harvard, or really anywhere in major American philosophy 
departments. In interpreting a philosophic work, I was taught by Mansfield and Mahdi to 
address the arguments in the context of the work as a whole and its intention. The goal of 
reading was to listen, Mahdi and Mansfield taught, to open oneself to the voice of a thinker 
from another time and place, not to quarry the texts for arguments that might be useful for 
political or scholarly purposes. One attempted to think with Plato or Hobbes or Maimonides or 
Alfarabi by trying to take into account what these authors themselves presented as worth 
thinking about. The way to do that, Mansfield and Mahdi taught, was by reading their works 
as wholes.13 By suspending one’s own judgment—not just about what was true but also about 
what mattered—in order to understand the author’s, every aspect of one’s own values and 
purposes was put into question, whether one had opened the Republic, Leviathan, Guide of the 
Perplexed, or The Attainment of Happiness for the first time or the fifteenth. 
At that time, the late 1980s, the only admissible approach within leading philosophy 
departments, especially in regard to the ancient Greek texts that interested me most, was to 
extract the arguments from the texts and analyze them as if they had appeared in the latest issue 
of Mind or the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and as if the authors of those texts had 
the same purposes and the same understanding of philosophy as American philosophy 
professors in top-ranked departments. Van Norden still acknowledges and in a way respects 
the prejudice for arguments as opposed to drama, metaphors, or myths as the test of whether a 
work or an author is truly philosophical (144–148). I have little doubt, though, that had I chosen 
to study in the Philosophy Department in Emerson Hall I would not have been barred from 
completing a Ph.D. on any philosophic text within or outside the Western canon. 
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After Harvard I spent a year in Israel, nominally enrolled at Hebrew University, but mainly 
studying in a Talmudical college or yeshiva. While the students in my yeshiva were American, 
English, or Australian college graduates or college bound, the study of Jewish philosophical 
texts had no formal place in the curriculum. The curriculum consisted almost exclusively of 
Talmud and Jewish law, with a little Hebrew Bible on the side. While two of the teachers had 
Ph.D.s, those were in Semitic philology and linguistics, not philosophy. From within the 
perspective and purposes of the yeshiva, philosophy was not only marginal but questionably 
worthwhile. Jewish philosophy books were on the shelves in the study hall, but we were not 
taught them or encouraged to read them.  
The one practical thing I learned in Israel was that to maximize my chances for an academic 
post in Israel, my best bet was to go abroad again and take a Ph.D. in something that was not 
Israeli or Jewish. So in the Fall of 1990 I went to the Political Science Department at The 
University of Chicago. At Chicago I studied a lot of Plato and Aristotle, and some Alfarabi, 
Averroes, and Maimonides, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger; Greek, but no Arabic and not 
much German. In political science at Chicago, as elsewhere, Chinese and Indian politics were 
taught as a matter of course (I TA’d for Dali Yang and wrote my master’s thesis on the 
collectivization and decollectivization of agriculture in China and the Soviet Union with the 
Indian politics specialist Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and the sociologist of China William 
Parish—though I know neither Chinese nor Russian).14 
I also took a great many courses in the Committee on Social Thought. I studied Arabic 
philosophy there with Ralph Lerner, Hillel Fradkin, and Joel Kraemer (none of whom were 
philosophy professors), and German philosophy with Robert Pippin. The Committee also 
taught nonwestern literature (despite the legacy there of Saul Bellow and Allan Bloom, both of 
whom ridiculed the notion of a “Shakespeare among the Zulus”), though I didn’t study it, or 
much postclassical Western literature either. I spent a little time with the philosophy professors 
who taught Greek and even Jewish texts, but I did not find their approach to reading congenial. 
I got more out of reading Plato with the classicists Arthur Adkins and Elizabeth Asmis, and, 
though I was pretty thickheaded, from a course on feminist philosophy with Candace Vogler. 
I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on gender and politics in Plato: the feminist scholars from 
reading whom I learned the most were the philosophers Luce Irigaray and Michèle Le Dœuff, 
and the legal scholar and advocate Catherine MacKinnon. 
In any case my education at Chicago avoided the narrowness and concern with pedigree of 
American academic philosophy that Van Norden both condemns and exemplifies. My 
education was also, except in the courses with Robert Pippin and Candace Vogler, lacking in 
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rigor or (it seemed to me at the time) any real feel for philosophic problems. As an 
undergraduate and graduate student, I read philosophy but not, mostly, with philosophy 
professors, and I learned to read (which was what was most important to me) but I did not learn 
much philosophy. 
I left Chicago for Tel Aviv University in 1995, and after a year there as an instructor spent 
two years at the University of Toronto as a postdoctoral student. My experience studying 
political philosophy with Clifford Orwin and Thomas Pangle and Canadian political thought 
with Donald Forbes recapitulated the strengths and weaknesses of my Chicago education. More 
important for my subsequent development was reading Josiah Ober, who presented a radical 
rethinking of ancient and therefore of modern democracy, and Toronto’s own Deborah Black, 
who argued that the medieval Arab Aristotelians had seen rhetoric and poetics as parts of 
logic.15 Influenced by Black and Ober I moved from political philosophy to the logical and 
ontological analysis of rhetorical concepts like character, vividness, and proof by example. 
My philosophical education began again in 1999 when I had my first encounter with Irad 
Kimhi, the greatest teacher of philosophy I have ever known. 
Through years of auditing classes and talking with Irad, as we call him, I finally gained a 
grasp of the basic development of philosophy from Descartes and Spinoza to Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger. I learned notions and methods that I could use to work out the analysis of rhetorical 
concepts that I had already begun. Irad also got me to read François Jullien, the French scholar 
of Chinese thought and philosophy. It is unfortunate that Van Norden doesn’t mention Jullien 
either in this book or in the bibliography on Chinese philosophy on his webpage, for Jullien 
brings Chinese thinkers to bear on fundamental questions of ontology, society, and politics. 
Jullien thus also helps us to get a better handle on both Chinese and non-Chinese alternatives 
to what Van Norden calls “individualistic metaphysics” (39).16 
Having been at the margins of economics, philosophy, and rhetorical studies my work since 
2008 has moved to the margins of American history. I am still trying to develop the ontological 
analysis of concepts and structures, but this time applied to international relations concepts like 
the balance of power, empire, and world order, and to the administrative and bureaucratic 
apparatus of foreign policy decision-making. It would therefore be unfair for me to blame my 
failure to discipline myself on the narrowness or other weaknesses of the discipline of 
philosophy in which Van Norden has pursued his career. 
 
Who are “we?” Van Norden writes that “we are doing philosophy when we engage in dialogue 
about problems that are important in our culture” (142). Yet Van Norden ever explains who 
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“we” are or what “our culture” is, or whether university and university philosophy departments 
have or should have some role in transmitting or preserving it. Van Norden contends against 
Allan Bloom that one can take one’s bearings from the books of another culture than the one 
into which one was born, that there is nothing existentially significant for the individual about 
that culture that happens to be one’s own. Can “we” really furnish “our” soul out of any weighty 
book whatsoever? One possibility is that we might reject our tradition but fail to be fully 
initiated into another, and confuse professional attainments in a discipline—demonstrated by a 
long c.v.—with a well-furnished soul. To avoid that substitution of professionalization for 
personality, it might help to get clear on the similarities and differences between the use of the 
word “philosopher” in Plato’s Republic and the use in the Leiter Reports and the APA’s Jobs 
for Philosophers.  
There is also the issue of quality, which Van Norden addresses, but I think in an evasive and 
bloodless way, partly because that touches on the “third rail” of affirmative action, and partly 
because he wants more jobs for scholars of “less commonly taught philosophies” but doesn’t 
want to soil his nonacademic readers with the dirt on the hiring process. I can tell you from 
twenty years as permanent faculty in a political science department that anytime you decide 
that covering a subfield is important, that means that you are going to prioritize hiring 
somebody in that subfield over hiring somebody with the best work or the best credentials. 
That applies when the subfield that is to be covered is perceived as central as well as when it 
is to be covered in the name of “diversity.” But since that problem applies across all subfields 
I think it is not so sticky or ominous. 
More seriously, when we are talking about how much to teach “less commonly taught 
philosophies” the discussion often gets conflated with the question of who should teach them 
(see Van Norden 34). Do Chinese scholars have some unique authority in Chinese philosophy? 
Do Jewish scholars have some unique authority in Jewish thought? A paper of mine on Jewish 
political thought was accepted without peer review in a general journal of intellectual history 
because gentile scholars refused to evaluate it and thus intervene in what they saw as the 
province of their Jewish colleagues. The problem is not so much affirmative action in faculty 
hiring as identity politics in scholarly assessment. This is something from which every scholar, 
including myself, who has written on less commonly taught philosophies has benefited in one 
way or another, though we have also suffered from the narrow-mindedness that Van Norden 
condemns. In assessing Van Norden’s argument, we must keep in mind that diversity is 
sometimes purchased at the expense of other aspects of scholarly quality, or even at the expense 
of procedural fairness. Moreover, we do our colleagues no favors by assuming they accept the 
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worth—much less the conclusions—of the texts with which their upbringing or education has 
made them familiar. 
As I have shown, I am too much an outsider to the American philosophy profession to 
present or even to assess detailed recommendations such as Van Norden offers about what 
philosophy departments should do. I have three suggestions, though. First, teach your students 
enough Aristotelian logic (from the Arab Aristotelians’ “expanded Organon” that includes not 
only the Prior and Posterior Analytics but also the Topics and the Rhetoric) to understand that, 
while some truths are demonstrable, any claim worth making in politics is disputable. Second, 
make sure all future faculty hires are people who understand that since “ethics, political 
philosophy, and philosophical theology” are “inherently controversial” (Van Norden 135), no 
matter how well-refuted is some political or religious belief, there is almost certainly a fellow 
academic philosopher who is smarter, better informed, and with stronger professional 
qualifications who thinks that anybody who disputes that belief is wildly mistaken, not to say 
an idiot or a charlatan. Third, make sure anybody who passes their doctoral qualifying exam 
has been humbled by their encounters with philosophical scholarship both within and beyond 
what is commonly taught. Nobody should take pride in what they haven’t read.17 
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